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Conclusion: 
The Never-Ending Crises 
Jane Leftwich Curry and Luba Fajfer 
A
lthough the final demise of Communism in Poland was by far the most 
dramatic of the crises that punctuated Communist rule there, it was not 
the beginning or the end of Poland' s transformation process. Virtually all 
the studies of transformations in Latin America and Southern Europe, as well as 
the developing literature on the changes in the communist world, have focused 
on the events and problems that just preceded the ending of one form of rule and 
the beginning of another. In the Polish case, at least, the transformation cannot 
be explained by the popular disaffection and the negotiations between the oppo-
nents of the regime and the Communist leaders. The "roots" of post-Communist 
rule are not to be found in the "topsoil" of Communism's collapse. Instead, they 
reach through four decades of Communist rule, the periodic "voting with their 
feet" Poles did when decisions and policies were far more than they could stom-
ach, and the seeming variety of methods the leaders tried to use to compromise 
with their disaffected nation. It was these decades that were real parts of the 
transformation. They were also the molders of a "new socialist man" who would 
rule and be ruled in ways very different from those men and women reared in 
Western-style democracies. Moreover, since only Poland underwent this many 
revolts and periods of instability in the decades of Communist rule, its failure to 
develop a viable balance between elite policy and popular demands in crisis 
after crisis raises critical questions about how systems and populations "learn" 
about politics and how to work their systems. The "Polish Road to Socialism" 
was forged out of the cumulation of these crises. So, too, were the paths for 
transformation. 
This book traces those upheavals and their causes and consequences. From 
the time this book began in 1981 until it went to press in 1995, Communist rule 
returned in full force and then collapsed. These essays were revised time and 
again to take in the new facts and revelations that came out as once-closed ar-
chives and silent leaders opened up or wrote memoirs. What we resisted doing 
was seeing the past in the light of the present. Instead, we hope that, in our 
overview, these analyses of Poland' s various periods of dramatic instability are 
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instructive not only in understanding communism but also in understanding the 
transition process in which the Poles are now engaged. 
What once appeared to be a reimposition of the Communist authorities' 
power and stability after every breakdown or partial breakdown now, in the 
light of the collapse of Communist rule, looks like a jumpy path of starts and 
stops on the road to democratization. These crises have taught important lessons 
not only to scholars but also the citizens of once-Communist Poland. The social 
and political processes created in this struggle are a unique legacy themselves, 
not only affecting the immediate post-Communist transition but, no doubt, de-
termining the very nature of the new politics, economics, and society that will 
be Poland. 
So, far, the literature that has driven Western views of the transition from 
Communism has been the literature on the supposed "democratization" of Latin 
America in the 1980s. 1 It is a literature that concludes that the modalities of 
transition determine the features of the new regimes and asserts that transitions 
to democracy are profoundly affected by the values and decisions of political 
leaders. 2 Their mistake, as this longer-run approach to system change demon-
strates, was not to look at the sweep of events3: the gradual movement to democ-
racy and the stops and starts along the almost forty-year-long road that, in retro-
spect, could not help shaping a new type of system. In no event, and most surely 
not in the last upheavals before Communism's demise, were leaders' covenants 
the deciding factors. Most often these upheavals were the products of mass up-
risings with no prologue other than intellectual criticism of the system. Nor did 
any one event arise solely from the experiences of its immediate prologue. On 
the contrary, there was no short-run or negotiated transition to democracy. In-
stead, elements appeared, some disappeared, and others reappeared or were 
strengthened in what appeared, until the "end" in 1989, to be a process of 
"liberalizing" the Communist system without changing or doing away with it. 4 
1 The most important of these works is Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democra-
cies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Ken Jowitt, in his volume of 
essays, New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992) complains (of the period immediately after Communism fell) about "the 
fetishlike repetition of the phrase, 'transition to democracy' as if saying it often enough, 
and inviting enough Latin American scholars from the United States to enough confer-
ences in Eastern Europe (and the Soviet Union) will magically guarantee a new demo-
cratic capitalist telos in place of the ethnic, economic, and territorial maelstrom that is the 
reality today" (p. 285). 
2 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, p. 6ff. 
3 Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," Comparative Politics (April 1990), 
pp. 359-77. 
4 For discussions of liberalization, see Ken Jowitt, "The Concepts of Liberalization, 
Integration, and Rationalization in the Context of East European Development," Studies 
in Comparative Communism 4, no. 2 ( 1979), pp. 79-92; and Andrzej Korbonski, 
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There is no denying that the level of institutional change in Poland and the 
rest of Eastern Europe was dramatic after 1989. Nor is it possible to link many 
of the institutional changes to the changes in the first three decades of Commu-
nist rule, although most of Poland' s "Great Leap Forward" economically was a 
prologue for marketizing reforms in the late 1980s. But there is a sense of "old 
wine, new bottles" as one looks at the landscape of increasing alienation and 
disillusionment, voter apathy, and distance between the leaders and the led in 
post-Communist Poland. Clearly, the kind and level of "civil society" and "civil 
political culture" play a major role. As a well-known Polish political scientist 
put it, "[f]or regime breakthrough, the most important are changes in the broadly 
defined culture, values, domains of thinking." 5 The experience of Communist 
rule and attempts to change created this "culture, values, domains of thinking" 
that have left an indelible mark on post-Communist Poland. Laws can change 
institutions; only years can change values and ways of thinking and acting. Pol-
ish politics will bear this legacy for generations. 
Various revolutionary experiences have had "boomerang effects" on the 
new Poland, so that even though they helped to bring about the ultimate victory 
of the anti-Communists, they also endangered or distorted some of the revolu-
tionary achievements.6 In Poland, the past periods of upheaval are as important 
to postcommunism as are the long years of "stable" Communism in between. 
They provide the stories, the symbols, the heroes, the enemies, the behaviors to 
be avoided and reused, and the referent points for events years after Commu-
nism ended. Their significance is far deeper even than the furor of "de-Commu-
nization," the willingness of Polish leaders to set aside pressing daily economic 
and social problems to examine the declaration of martial law, the shootings in 
the Katyn Forest, and the orders given to shoot demonstrators in 1970. 
The tangled history of social upheavals that marked Polish Communist rule 
for forty-one years is, of course, not a simple, direct road from Stalinism to de-
mocracy (however it is defined) in which Polish society traveled as one unit. 
Rather it has been a series of demands, gains, and losses for each social group, 
for the Communist leaders, and for the rest of the society. In this, "the rules and 
procedures of citizenship either applied to political institutions previously gov-
erned by other principles . . . or extended to cover issues and institutions not 
previously subject to citizen participation" have been established, violated, and 
"Comparing Liberalization Processes in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Analysis," Com-
parative Politics 4, no. 2 (1979), p. 231-49, and "Liberalization Processes" in Com-
parative Socialist Systems, Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Carl Beck, eds. (Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, Center for International Studies, pp. 192-214). 
5 Wojciech Lamentowicz, "Jaki ustoj mamy w Polscc>-ankieta," Polityka (January 19, 
1991), p. 3. 
6 Piotr Sztompka, "Intangibles and Imponderables of Transition to Democracy," Stud-
ies in Comparative Communism 24, no. 3, pp. 295-330. 
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taken away only to be demanded and returned in the next crisis, or the next. The 
"rules and procedures of citizenship" are 
... the right to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with respect 
to the making of collective choices and the obligation of those implementing 
such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the 
polity. Inversely, this principle imposes obligation on the ruled-to respect 
the legitimacy of choices made by deliberation among equals and rights of 
rulers . . . to act with authority . . . to promote the effectiveness of such 
choices and to protect the polity from threats to its persistence.7 
To follow the tangled path that brought Poland to post-Communism, we must 
look at the various groups and their gains and losses in the establishment of the 
"rules and procedures of citizenship." For democratic rules and procedures were 
not "gained" or "lost" at any time by the whole society; rather, they were gained 
and lost by groups. The result has been not only the very different attitudes of 
groups to their rights and responsibilities as citizens but also a uniquely Polish 
road to transition since only in Poland were there repeated and all-encompassing 
crises that destabilized the whole system from the Stalinist period on. 
In 1956, all citizens temporarily seized the "right to be treated" as equal. 
Initially, with the elections of 1956 and the activities of intellectual groups and 
spontaneous workers' councils, they also took on the obligation to respect the 
legitimacy of the choices made in the deliberations by the political rulers. Peas-
ants were released from the domination of the state over their lands. The Catho-
lic Church gained partial power over its own sphere of interest, if not the right to 
be treated as an equal with other institutions. It also publicly accepted the obli-
gation to accept the legitimacy of choices made by the rulers and, in leading 
their parishioners to vote, of the rulers themselves. Public servants, even, in their 
abandonment of control functions like censorship, acted as though they should 
be equal parties in decision making. 
The rulers maintained the right to act with authority by their own shift of 
power from one set of Communist rulers to the next. Yet, their avoidance of any 
renunciation of party or state power protected them from obligations to be ac-
cessible and accountable. This facilitated the rulers ' retreat from recognizing the 
rights that citizens and groups had gained in the heady days of the Polish Octo-
ber. 
What was left from 1956 was a sense of the rulers having been empowered 
by citizens and of citizens having felt empowered over their lives for a time. 
Liberalization for peasants and the Church was the part of this empowerment 
that remained for the rest of the Communist period. It, coupled with the memo-
ries of promises made and then ignored, helped maintain the pressure for further 
gains and the population ' s limited compliance with Communist laws and rules 
for the rest of the Communist period. 
7 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions , pp. 7-8. 
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The 1968 crisis of intellectual battles against the government's stagnation, 
framed as it was in terms of anti-Semitism, was one in which no gains were 
made by any group; neither the opposition nor the government won. While large 
numbers of university students were involved and a substantial number of 
young professionals were able to fill the positions of the men and women who 
had been pushed out during the anti-Semitic campaign, this was not a mass up-
heaval. Nor was it one that resulted in a change of leaders, a series of promises, 
or even a temporary shift in policies. If anything, what was remembered by the 
participants in the next revolts was the gulf between the intellectuals who dem-
onstrated and the workers who watched in 1968. 
Given the direction of the transformation of Poland and the continuation of 
crises after this book was conceived, the story of the 1968 crisis has been left to 
be told elsewhere. 8 The memory of the anti-Semitic campaign is still real in the 
minds of many who took over after the fall of the Communists. But the upheaval 
itself was different from the one that preceded it and the ones that would follow. 
What it did was set the stage for the next crisis. Not only was the leaders' 
already minimal sense of obligation to be accountable reduced but the rulers 
looked so embattled and indecisive that the sense of obligation of the ruled, be 
they party or state administrators or ordinary citizens, to respect the leaders' 
policy choices was also reduced. No one claimed to have a right to be equals, 
but at that point to be simply told what to do was not acceptable either. 
In 1970, workers did demand the right to be heard and have both economic 
and structural policy protecting their interests. But even at the negotiating table 
they were willing to accept a less than equal position. They settled for economic 
gains without systemic changes. Intellectuals did not openly support workers' 
rights or propose that workers and intellectuals be treated as equals in policy 
deliberations. 
The Gierek regime claimed to accept its democratic obligation to be 
equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity in its honey-
moon stage. But, in doing this, it spoke in a language that was heard in ways 
very different from the meaning the rulers gave it. By allowing themselves to be 
understood as accountable, the regime leaders relinquished some of their claim 
to be able to act with the authority their predecessors had claimed for them-
selves. They created further burdens for their rule by promising that Poland 
would be a "second Japan": these promises of an economic nirvana were not 
achievable. Yet they were believed, creating demands and burdens the regime 
could not hope to fulfill. 
The mini-crisis of 1976 began to reverse some of this inequity and went 
further to reduce the regime's claim to act with authority. Workers refused to 
recognize the rulers' right to make policy for price increases. They won over 
policy but did not reclaim their right to be heard and treated as equals. On the 
8 Jack Beliasiak, "Social Confrontation to Contrived Crises-March 1968 in Poland," 
East European Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1988), pp. 81-105. 
248 POLAND' S PERMANENT REVOLUTION 
other hand, intellectuals began to champion workers' rights to be heard if not to 
be treated as equals. 
Throughout the 1970s, the Church sought to make special gains for itself. 
Only after the 1976 crisis did it begin to openly champion the citizens ' right to 
be equals in the system---and that was done in support of intellectual dissent 
rather than by treating workers as equals. 
The initial Solidarity period was marked by the emergence of a kind of an-
archic polyarchy in which all the players sought not to be treated as equals but 
to get special treatment for themselves. Workers (including bureaucrats and 
managers), the Church, and intellectuals, each seeking not equal rights but spe-
cial rights, built their demands on realizing what had been promised them in the 
past. They asserted their claims even as groups linked together to ensure that 
others' gains did not block or supersede their own. 
Conversely, the rulers, in responding to the demands of individual groups 
and trying to preserve their power, did not claim to use equality as a principle in 
carrying out their obligations or rights, nor did they claim to have been part of 
an accountable or accessible regime. Their strategy was (1) to acknowledge their 
failure to wipe out the obligations incurred by past economic and social prom-
ises and (2) to attempt to buy groups off piecemeal to preserve their own power. 
For them, political concessions, given their past experiences at being able to 
reverse their promises, were far cheaper and more possible than promising eco-
nomic gains they knew could not be achieved anyway. 
What changed the dynamics in this situation was (1) intergroup competi-
tion over goals and (2) the opposition's refusal to depend on party leaders and 
their reliance on legislation. Intergroup competition pushed the system to give, 
piecemeal to all, the same union and free-speech rights that they had given in 
the heat of battle to Solidarity workers on the seacoast. The reliance on legisla-
tion was used by the regime not to prevent failures but to delay responding to 
popular demands as they had promised. It inadvertently began the move from 
citizenship to full democratization. When laws on censorship or union registra-
tion were passed, they exceeded the promises made in 1956 and 1970 for a 
"freer" information system and worker self-management. However unequal 
their provisions were, they applied citizenship principles "to institutions previ-
ously governed by other principles" and extended these principles "to cover 
issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation." 9 
The tension that developed between groups was increasingly mollified by 
granting groups the right to make proposals, advocate in their areas of expertise, 
and develop intergroup coordinating commissions. For instance, journalists and 
academics got the right to draft Solidarity-supported legislation on press censor-
ship, and intellectual and professional groups formed an overarching association 
to coordinate all their demands and policy proposals. At the same time, the Soli-
darity structure in which each individual group had the right to refuse to act on 
9 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions , pp. 7-8. 
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or to ignore the decisions of central commissions remained the basic model for 
all groups. 
Two factors stopped this polyarchic and often anarchic process, the fifteen 
months of Poland's 1980-81 crisis. The first was the collapse of the economy, 
which affected individuals no matter what their income level or position. It also 
made individuals depend on each other to find scarce foodstuffs and consumer 
goods. The resulting mini-communities became forces in themselves. 10 The sec-
ond block to anarchy was the declaration of martial law. It shocked virtually the 
entire society and demonstrated, at least for the short run, the fragility of any 
gains that came without total restructuring of the entire system. No claim by the 
authorities that they were acting to preserve the state had any resonance. Instead, 
the thread of the Communist ideology and its hold on the system seemed to 
break with martial law. Even for the half of the population that said, on public 
surveys, that martial law was necessary, the claims of a "worker state" and the 
party as "the vanguard of the proletariat" rang hollow. As party members turned 
their party cards in by the basketful, the ideological justifications for the system 
fell away from both the leaders' presentations of themselves and the popula-
tions' perceptions of what made the system work. Raw power, Soviet interven-
tion, and popular apathy came to be the justifications for Communist rule . 
Direct connections between workers and their former intellectual compa-
triots were also broken by the apparent failure of Solidarity and the raw force of 
martial law. The defeat of martial law remained the only universal goal for 
Poles. But the power of this goal was clouded by the fact that even the Jaruzel-
ski elite called for its end. Communist rulers sought to relegitimize themselves 
by offering to accept the obligation to implement policies equally, to expand 
citizen participation, and to apply citizenship principles to previously excluded 
institutions. They also increasingly downplayed their rights to act with authority. 
The reality was that, consciously or not, the rulers had no choice but to 
tal<:e the avenue they did. Citizens increasingly reduced their contacts with the 
system. They either did not work productively or entered into private work out-
side the system. They simply ignored the regime and its rules. As time went on, 
the various groupings in the system began to make their own rules in the pat-
terns of their actions. This all happened even as the formal Solidarity movement 
became weaker. 
By 1988, underground Solidarity was essentially aboveground but without 
any real power to lead. On the other side, the regime could not deny its own 
paralysis. Both sides saw each other's weaknesses and sought to counter their 
individual loss of power. The solution for both was to hold the roundtable talks 
and demonstrate their ability to make mutual gains or grant mutual concessions. 
This forced both sides to try to establish the broadest possible coalitions and 
treat all groups as equals. Initially, the Solidarity side limited its demands to 
what it was sure it could win with the full support of the society: the relegaliza-
w Janine Wadel, The Private Poland (New York: Facts on File, 1986), p. 230. 
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tion of Solidarity, a goal achieved in fonn if not in law by the fact that Solidarity 
picked the members of the opposition side of the roundtable talks. The govern-
ment sought to undennine Solidarity's leadership by granting far more than 
Solidarity had ever sought. Neither was prepared for the reality of the Commu-
nist authority' s unpopularity or the Soviet Union's tolerance, so both sides lim-
ited their demands and planned for a publicly Communist-dominated, if really 
freed, political system. 
The breakthrough in the elections made the old, if ignored, reality of the 
sham of Communist rule clear. Elite compromises and pacts lost their power 
when the votes were counted and the Communists had lost resoundingly. The 
pact within the opposition to stand finn against the Communists was fragile . 
The pact between the Communist Party and the "allied" parties that had toler-
ated Communist dominance for forty years was even more fragile: once there 
was another coalition partner, the Peasant and Democratic parties went to it. The 
shock of the victory was so great that it seemed even more significant than it 
would have seemed under nonnal circumstances. It sent shock waves through 
Eastern Europe that aroused other populations as well. 
There was also a real pressure for legislation to transfonn the institutions. 
The economic crisis and the potential for real suffering and increased inequality 
resulted in an overwhelming sense of pressure to create a political and legal 
system that guaranteed not only that the rules and procedures were extended to 
cover all issues and institutions but also that they would apply to all equally. 
This was good for all but the leaders of the Church and the old Solidarity. For 
them, there was an inherent right of rule that was based on how hard they had 
fought Communism in the past. It gave them a right that they could exercise 
among the elected elites but that had little appeal to the rest of the population. 
In sum, democratization in Poland has not been a one-year process or even 
a ten-year struggle but was the culmination of thirty-three years of small moves 
forward and backward on the road to de-authoritarianization. The potential for 
success at every point was affected as much by the memories of partial gains 
and the earlier paths of unequal grants of citizenship rights and responsibilities 
as much as it was by some conscious pact process or the dynamics of any given 
moment. 
Democratization in Poland was also not a move from a functioning and 
controlling authoritarian leadership to a democratic one. The leaders in Poland 
did not simply lose their will to rule and control, as democratization theory 
would have it. Nor did they simply misjudge the situation and give away their 
powers in a vain attempt to ensure their existing powers by co-opting the op-
position. The realities of the rule of the Communist authorities from the 1970s 
on were hardly consistent with communist ideology or with Western images of 
"Communist rule." 
No leader in Poland since 1956 has come to power without another 
leader's being ousted in order to placate the populace. Polish leaders, then, have 
not had honeymoons. They have been put almost instantly in the position of 
being appointed to placate popular disaffection and reassert the party's control. 
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The modus vivendi that has been used over and over has been a simple one: 
promise change for the better, make symbolic links to the populace or groups in 
it, and quietly strengthen institutions of control. 
No leader in postwar Poland has felt secure enough in his rule to openly 
defy the populace and exert open control and force by killing off opposition 
leaders or engaging in ongoing and large scale repression. Even Stalinist party 
chief Boleslaw Bierut was slow to risk jailing the Church's top leaders or hold-
ing show trials complete with death sentences. (After all, Stalin himself had said 
that the Poles were unrulable.) All of this has meant that no leader brought up 
through the ranks of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) ruled with a 
sense of security. Instead, the party history they knew was one littered with 
failed leaders and failed policies. In their rule, then, they all made policy sure in 
the knowledge that they would face failure sooner or later. Promises of change 
and the leaders' wariness of the irresolvability of the demands coming to them 
from both sides--from other party elites for control and from the populace for 
them to fulfill often unachievable promises-paralyzed them before any hon-
eymoon period was over. The disaffection they faced on both sides discouraged 
them from trying to be either popular or strong in the end. 
Thus the leaders inadvertently precipitated their own overthrow. They re-
warded themselves in their isolation with more and more "perks" (however 
petty many of them were) and allowed those around them to do the same. In 
doing this, they lost touch with popular feelings and experiences. They disillu-
sioned early supporters by failing to follow through on their policy promises. 
Years into their rule, the leaders even lost interest in hearing about their re-
gime's failings. Ultimately, top leaders abandoned their rule long before they 
were ousted. For them, it was much easier to step aside and let others make de-
cisions, as Gierek essentially did in 1980. In the end, lower levels in the party 
and state leadership went their own way and simply had opponents watched, not 
openly confronted. Since no turnover of power brought a bloodletting among 
the elite, the stakes were never high for battling within the elite to keep power. 
In this way, the leaders each precipitated the next crisis and their own 
ouster. The "opportunity costs" of opposition were reduced. Even if the elite 
around them looked unified, as Gierek's did in early 1980, they too were sucked 
into this pattern of either claiming victory and retreating or attempting to build 
their own empires and avoid dealing with problems on the "outside." Policy 
drifted and was made without regard for the whole picture. Prices were in-
creased or policies changed in a way that challenged the disillusioned popula-
tion to rise up. It did. Leaders were switched. The old ones held on to their perks 
and life went on. Only the next leader faced a less trusting population and a 
surer knowledge that his rule was not permanent. 
More important, though, than the top leaders' self-destruction and retreat 
from their own power were the attitudes of lower-level elites-the gatekeepers 
and front men for the rulers. They were the ministry officials and party bureau-
crats who actually made policy. Their vices were not all that different from the 
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party leaders', but they could not deny failures or totally isolate themselves as 
the top leaders tried to do. In crises, they tended to sympathize and even join in 
attacks on the system, except when they themselves were under attack. The re-
volts of 1956 and 1970 were, though, somewhat different. In 1956, the censors 
did attack their own institution and disband themselves, only to return to work 
because they needed the money. In 1970, many of those who had moved into 
their jobs in 1968 relished Gierek's criticism of past inadequacies and promises 
of rational policy based on specialists being involved in decision making. 
As these crises built up, bureaucrats, in one way or another, retreated to 
protect themselves. They went to their work places and went through the mo-
tions of doing their jobs. When it was possible in the late 1980s, some retreated 
into private industry. All of this decreased their will to rule and the population's 
perception that the system was working. Changing regimes and promising a 
change of direction did not mean much, either, to the population. 
The obvious question is then, Why was there police violence against dem-
onstrators in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1981 if the will to rule was lost? The 
answer seems to be that it was the "police's job" to use violence. The use of 
violence reflected the distance between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers, by 
the time they used violence in 1980 or decided not to use it in the strikes of 
1988, no longer had the desire to rule. Their goal was damage control. Often 
too, the repression was directed not by the top leader but by those around him 
who wanted to preserve their power and improve their chances of rising to the 
top. Whatever the motive, in all of the crises in Communist-era history in Po-
land, the violence was limited; ultimately the rulers gave up to others rather than 
continue the battle. The martial-law incident was the apparent exception, in 
which repression was carefully planned. There were no other Communist lead-
ers in the wings of the establishment who were perceived as viable alternatives 
able to get public support and maintain control. 
At the same time, martial law was also a last resort, one that had been put 
off since the spring of 1980. From the perspective of the leadership, the West 
and the Soviet Union both were pressing them to "get control." This time, 
though, they had no ready way to do so; there were no alternative leaders or 
policies with public credibility waiting in the wings. The distance between the 
rulers and the ruled, as well as the Jaruzelski leadership's remoteness from the 
desire to rule as opposed to simply holding on to power, was equally clear. The 
imposition of martial law was virtually the end of their planning. Their apparent 
assumption was that the public and the external forces pressing on Poland would 
be satisfied enough to retreat if the Solidarity "disruption" were ended by the 
interning of Solidarity's leaders. The failures of the past were dealt with by the 
interning of Gierek era leaders as well . Beyond this, there was really no alterna-
tive plan. The leaders seemed comfortable with the vague notion that they 
would continue with "reform" without this extra disruption. 
~ 
Jaruzelski and the elites who surrounded him seem also to have sought 
ways to retreat from the martial law they imposed. Having lost the control they 
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thought martial law would give them, these leaders moved to get a grasp on 
those they were trying to rule and to reach out to the "friendly opposition" by 
drawing in anyone from the "loyal" opposition who would join them in the con-
sultative councils they set up. Clearly, repression and pure control were not the 
modes of rule they wanted to use. Instead, the Jaruzelski circle either tried to 
ignore popular opposition or to co-opt it. 
By the end of the 1980s, there was still no alternative leader in the wings 
of the Communist establishment to whom power could be passed to garner at 
least temporary public support. Nor was there any support internationally or 
domestically for any attempt to use force to get back the power that the Com-
munist party felt it had once held. So the Communist leaders tried a variation on 
the old mode of passing power on. Since they saw the Solidarity leadership as 
being weakened by years of not being able to deliver gains to its erstwhile sup-
porters, Jaruzelski and the "soft-liners" around him saw them as co-optable. 
Drawing them in would be a way to pass power on to another group without 
having to give up Communist control. They instituted the roundtables with the 
hope that, in the face of popular pressure against the regime that was not under 
Solidarity's control, they could negotiate with Solidarity and the rest of the op-
position as equals. What they sought was a compromise pact over which both 
sides could say and feel that they had won. The establishment of a pn;:sidency 
and a freely elected senate was perceived at that point as a way for Jaruzelski to 
reassure the Soviets, even as he retreated from direct power by sharing it and 
maintaining a "heroic" position for himself. 
That things went further and faster than they were expected to go is an 
anomaly of historical currents and also a reflection of the leaders' lack of a real 
desire to keep control or even the appearance of ruling. It is also a reflection of 
the fact that neither they nor those below them were functioning and controlling 
elites (or even thought of themselves as such) when the final crisis began. 
Unlike other countries in the theoretical picture of democratization charted 
by Western scholars from the Latin American and Southern European experi-
ence, democratization in Poland was never a purely elite process. From the first 
of Poland's crises, mass action and mass demands were triggers for change in 
every crisis except that of 1968, when intellectual battles combined with internal 
party assaults. Of course, the Polish masses were not the masses of Latin Amer-
ica or even Southern Europe. They tend to be universally educated in a system 
that taught them, directly, that they were important forces and, indirectly, that 
they could have little real impact on the system and should focus on their own 
individual needs. The combination of Poland' s historic ties with the West and 
the curiosity triggered by censored media made them acutely aware of the world 
around them. And, although the possibilities for social mobility from the work-
ing class to the white collar class or actual leadership and managerial positions 
really ended in the early 1960s when Poland's economic transformation slowed, 
workers were imbued with the ideology that theirs was a workers' state. 
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The limits set on upward mobility when Poland' s industrialization drive 
slowed down effectively separated the worlds of workers and intellectuals. It set 
workers apart from even the party and state leaders who claimed to have come 
from working-class stock but who had been in the party or state bureaucracy for 
so long that they no longer even had empathy for "workers." Furthermore, while 
resolution of the crises of 1956, 1968, and 1970 reflected links between intellec-
tuals and rulers, the later two crises reflected the emergence of a new elite from 
outside the intellectual centers of Warsaw and Cracow, the Gierek elite, that 
never really made links with Poland's traditional circles of intellectuals. As a 
result, intellectuals were neither drawn into elite battles, as they were in 1956 
and 1968, nor were they unwilling to involve themselves in worker battles with 
the Communist rulers as they were in 1970. Instead, in 1976, 1980, and 1989, 
intellectuals were separated enough from the party and state elite that they were 
willing to align ( although never as equals) with worker activists. So, in 197 6, 
1980, and 1989, there were added intrigues: the regime sought to separate work-
ers and intellectuals by playing to workers and discrediting their intellectual 
supporters, while intellectual dissidents sought to help (with the Committee in 
Defense of the Workers, KOR, in 1976), to advise as they did in 1980, and to 
cooperate with and provide expertise for workers as they did at the roundtables 
in 1989. Throughout all of these intrigues, though, the line between workers and 
intellectuals-dissident or ruling-remained. Neither group's plays were effec-
tive. When change came in every crisis, it came as a result of worker action and 
not elite trade-offs. When the common "enemy" of communism was van-
quished, the alliance then fell into a class battle that fragmented further and 
further down. 
Peasants were the missing group in the crises after 1956. That was the cri-
sis that ended farm collectivization so definitively that it never reentered the 
policy framework. The peasants' part in the crises of Poland came from the im-
pact of their work on the market: the price as well as the presence or absence of 
agricultural products on the market always played a large part in popular as-
sessments of the regime. Price increases on agricultural goods triggered all of 
the crises but 1968. To the party elite, the peasant class remained the most im-
mutable group in Poland. No elite dared to try to "communize" them. At the 
same time, the devotion of the regime to industrial priorities and the reluctance 
of any Communist regime to justify "private peasants" meant that the state pol-
icy on agriculture did nothing to encourage agricultural production even though 
it depended on that production for its hold on power and its ability to make Po-
land economically functional. 
The presence or absence of active mass support determined the winners 
and losers as well as the content of negotiations. This meant that the negotiating 
process did not preempt mass demands but was determined and spurred on by 
them. For the opposition, the censorship and direction of the media and other 
controls made them mythical heroes, if they were known, but it did not allow 
them to have their ideas known or to build trust. The distancing from the popu-
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lation and real exchanges this caused was evidenced, most clearly, in their sur-
prise at the shipyard strikes in 1980. 
In 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1989, mass actions began the movements 
for change. Only in 1968 was the crisis precipitated at an elite or intellectual 
level and then used by the internal party battles. In 1956, workers' spontaneous 
strikes in Poznan broke through the elite wall. What followed was less a process 
of negotiation than of conversation in which the entire urban population partici-
pated and to which the party elite reacted by bringing in Wladyslaw Gomulka as 
a popular symbol. Trusted by the population as a rebel in the party, Gomulka 
was also trusted by the de-Stalinizing elite as a man who could be counted on to 
return order without undue liberalization. Negotiations in the traditional sense of 
compromise between groups with different program alternatives simply did not 
occur. The two sides talked only when the elite searched for ways to rally mass 
support against what they saw as a potential hard-liner coup. The significance of 
mass action is also clear in the reluctance of Gomulka to back down on his 
"granted compact" with the peasants and the Church and in the ease with which 
he did back away from intellectual gains. 
In 1968, pacts were also negotiated at the top. The battle in the leadership 
was between two groups of Communists. But this was not a crisis of the ruled 
and the rulers. It was a crisis that marked individuals as "good" or "bad" among 
their intellectual compatriots. This also made it hard for intellectuals to feel the 
commonality with workers required for them to have joined in "their" battle in 
1970. All of this made this crisis quantitatively and qualitatively different 
enough to be excluded from this discussion even though the Moczar party fac-
tion played on the traditional nationalism and anti-Semitism of the population in 
the hope of creating a mass base. 
After this upheaval, the Gomulka elite retreated on all but its promise of 
returning stability for the rather massive state and party administrative corps. At 
the same time, the Gomulka elite tried to hold on by making initial moves to 
improve the economic lot of the population. Both were clearly playing to the 
masses. For both, the intellectuals were tools and symbols of "mass potential" 
but not critical actors. 
In 1970, intellectuals and the intelligentsia were, at the least, secondary 
actors. Workers organized themselves and fought for economic and political 
rights. Intellectuals and white-collar professional elites--at either end of the 
ideological spectrum- played no real role. Workers had not sided with them in 
1968, and the price increases, proportional salary hikes, rapid replacement of 
Gomulka, and promises of Gierek for change based on "consultation" with them 
were all to their liking. Divisions in the party elite had long existed. All sides, 
when faced with mass fury, attempted to placate the workers again by bringing 
in a new face to whom the population had looked as a "good leader." In the 
process, the white-collar "masses" were bought off by the suggestion that they 
would have a voice in policy. 
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All of Gierek's promises succeeded in raising popular expectations. They 
did not succeed in solving Poland's problems or in achieving any real 
"consultation" or sense of "inclusion" it to the intellectuals and intelligentsia in 
policy making. As a result, when the same problems had to be dealt with in 
1976, there were no new solutions, only a greater sense of alienation among the 
white-collar class. Therefore, although the Baltic seacoast workers who had 
brought down the Gomulka regime remembered their past disappointments 
enough not to take the risk of opposition in 197 6, intellectuals were willing to 
marshal their resources to help workers. A core group of them, plus a larger 
contingent of individuals prepared to donate money to the cause, did this by 
forming a Committee in Defense of the Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow, 
KOR) that first collected money to provide legal fees for arrested workers and 
support for their families. 
Once they had organized to help arrested workers, intellectuals continued 
the KOR organization and expanded it to include publications and education as 
well. From this, the structure for popular action changed dramatically. No 
longer was 'it simply an ad hoc organization triggered by elite actions. It became 
an ongoing, if small-scale, force to educate the population and create an alterna-
tive base to "lead" the wider population to think through the moral alternatives 
to Communist rule. This became the first and, ultimately, the biggest and most 
complex of the dissident organizations that would press for change within the 
Communist system in Eastern Europe and make links with the West to ensure 
ongoing concern in the West for human rights issues in these states. Its reach 
was not great enough for it to be credited with "making" the changes in the 
1980s. But it certainly provided a ready and visible alternative elite. 
The 1980s were a time of worker-intellectual alliances in Poland. But, 
from 1976 on, intellectuals ' role meshed with workers' leads: they set up 
committees to protect workers who had already taken action in 1976 and, in 
1980, they entered the shipyards and were told they were welcome to consult as 
to how workers could best achieve their goals; still, they were not to tell workers 
what to do. In 1989, their role was dependent on Lech Walesa. Even in the elec-
tions, intellectuals were, by and large, the parliamentary candidates for Solidar-
ity. They ran as worker Lech Walesa's candidates, not as individuals with pro-
grams and leadership potential. Even Walesa's nomination of his once intellec-
tual advisor, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as prime minister was, for Walesa, not a 
ceding of power to him or to intellectuals but the creation of a tolerable "front 
man" for these initial years. When he would not cede power to Walesa, 
Mazowiecki himself became an expendable class enemy for Walesa's group. 
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Conclusion 
The history of Poland's crises is one that demands a rereading not only because 
the events of the last forty years are the base of the events that brought down 
Communism in 1989 and that shape the destiny of post-Communist Poland but 
also because Poland's crisis history challenges old patterns and expectations 
from other times and other world areas. It demands that we look at events, ac-
tors, and processes as interwoven parts of a cloth and not as discrete events and 
factors. At the same time, to understand Poland today, we must understand not 
just the final downfall of Communism-it was a fait accompli before it hap-
pened--Out also the failed revolts, reforms, and attacks on it of the forty years 
before. 
They are the legacy on which this "new" polity is being built, both in the 
economic and political infrastructure that is "Poland" today and in the concerns 
of the leaders and the led alike. After all, among the biggest draws in the book 
market in Poland and among the key "new" sources for these chapters have been 
the memoirs and secret documents of leaders and events from Poland's Com-
munist past. For the people of Poland, the Communist era was and is a crucial 
measure of individuals and of options even ·now that it has ended. 
These crises are also realities on which theories of politics, Communist 
rule, and change should be based. What is clear is that such theories were good 
as topographical maps but not as road maps. They laid out the dimensions of 
Poland but not the direction of change for what remains a land of crises. 
Poland's pattern of politics through crises did not end with Communism's 
demise. Nor were the lessons learned in the previous thirty years set aside. Po-
land's formal transition out of Communism was faster than that of any other 
country in Eastern Europe. But, on many levels, little changed-not only be-
cause basic human behavior is hard to change but also because the 
"Communist" system had already been worn away by the stops and starts of 
crisis resolution since 1976. In its place, an ad hoc, inchoate political, economic, 
and social system had developed and existed inside the loose restraints of 
"communism." Once the restraints were dropped, the system lost some of its 
boundaries but none of its significance. So, the "new" Polish polity found itself 
dealing not simply with replacing the Communist system but also with adapting 
the ad hoc system that had grown up when Communism did not work either to 
control people or to please them. 
This made the transition from Communism far from smooth. People have 
tolerated economic losses that would have sent them to the streets in earlier 
years, but, politically, stability has been elusive. The pattern of democratization 
elsewhere--the formation of parties, the establishment of compacts limiting 
political conflict, and the relegitimization of institutions--<lid not occur in Po-
land in the initial years after Communism was halted. In fact, democracy and 
capitalism rapidly lost their luster. 
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Instead, although the system functioned and major economic reform was 
carried out, bringing with it real economic losses for the bulk of the population, 
the politics of Poland were marked by a fluidity complicated by continual crises 
in the political sphere as well as the legacies of the crises of Poland's past. 
The Polish revolution, after all, did not start in 1989 or even in the de-
nouement of martial law. It began more than three decades earlier. The crises 
that began in 1956 and recurred periodically from then on politicized and organ-
ized not only the intellectual strata of the society but also and, perhaps, most 
importantly, its working class. As a result, large numbers of people learned po-
litical action by being involved in various antigovernment activities, in compari-
son to the other East European countries that had been rocked at most by one 
societal crisis involving a far smaller part of the population than the repeated 
Polish crises did. What this taught Poles was a learned opposition to politics and 
politicians, as well as a pattern of being politically active by being opposed to 
the government. It also helped, in the last two decades, to forge links between 
intellectuals and workers in which workers were powerful even though intellec-
tuals were better positioned to get their specific demands fulfilled. 
In the process of this long-term political mobilization that involved a 
schooling of virtually the whole society, a Polish political discourse that was 
high on symbolism and low on pragmatism was established. 11 Such political 
discourse continues today in Poland's plethora of minuscule parties and long • 
debates over procedure rather than over the pressing policy issues of the day. 
This stylized political discourse is even more apparent in the use of the 
symbol of "de-Communization" as opposed to the institution of real action 
against former Communist leaders and elites. After all, Polish Communists were 
far more willing to give up than to repress crisis after crisis, so it is hard to 
blame them for the hardships of communism. At the same time, their tenacity in 
holding on and returning systems in upheaval back to a fragile but real status 
quo gives the stability in the bureaucracy far more significance as a real sign 
that little has really changed. 
The result of this symbolization or oversymbolization of political discourse 
has served to reinforce the Communist era rift between the governors and the 
governed. The population, even now that "its" movement and "its" heroes have 
won, still sees itself in opposition to the government. True, the elites are unable 
to satisfy the high expectations people brought with them to the post-
Communist era. But there is more to the dramatic disillusionment that Poles 
have voiced about their freely elected leaders, their sense that these leaders work 
for their own personal interests or those of their group and their sense that 
"politics" is, at best, "dirty business." 
The legacy of seeing oneself in opposition to the government is still at 
play. The "us" versus "them" sense is as much a part of Polish politics now as it 
was in the crisis-filled Communist era. The initial euphoria of victory did the 
11 Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Forms of Reasoning as Ideology," Telos, no. 66 (1985-86), pp. 
67-80. 
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same thing for the Polish population in 1989 that it did for it in I 956, 1970, and 
1980: it created a sense of victory and of being empowered among the popula-
tion with accompanying expectations that are, perhaps, far greater than else-
where in Eastern Europe where there was no buildup of crises. 12 High expecta-
tions made, as they had in the past, the failure of the government to fulfill its 
promises all the more alienating. As a result, after the Communist era, Poles 
began to follow the same pattern as they had followed in the past: a withdrawal 
from politics and political participation in general and into the private sphere or 
other social activities. At the same time, the Poles' sense that the government 
"owes" them remains strong. 
Where the parallel has stopped, so far, is at the precrisis stage: Poles have 
accepted more losses this time than they tolerated with the Communists. In part, 
this may be simply a reflection of all the new mechanisms that are available to 
them: In the past, when elections were structured and not really competitive, 
Poles "voted with their feet" and ousted their leaders. Now, Poles go to the polls 
and vote out their leaders, election after election. The difference is that the num-
ber of people who make even this small effort decreases with every election. 
To predict the trajectory of the future of any transition after its initial three 
or even five years is risky at best. But the repetitiousness of the factors and ac-
tors in the crises that have "made" Polish politics and their consistency in the 
post-Communist era have, at least, created some sense of an imperative direc-
tion of change or of politics itself. One assumption they do prove false is that 
"[t]he shorter the first stage of the transition, the more protracted the second 
stage of the economic transformation and democratic consolidation." 13 
After all, the ebb and flow of gains and losses in Poland's crises and the transi-
tion they created over three decades of movement out of Communism was the 
most explicit and longest breakdown period. The old links formed in the 
Communist-era movement from crisis to crisis fell apart rapidly once the main 
goal of Solidarity and the society it represented was achieved: Communism fell. 
New actors took over the political arena, divided not by opposition to anything 
but by more subtle issues: whether the move out of Communism should be fast 
or deliberate, whether the system should focus on the rule of law or the rule of 
the majority, and whether the priority of the governors should be on remaking 
the society or providing it with the material goods and services it had sought for 
the last forty years. 
In the Communist period, because the changes were most often piecemeal 
or promised and never achieved, Communism and the battles against it did 
nothing except to create a politicized but alienated population and a laundry list 
12 Sztompka, "Intangibles and Imponderables of Transition to Democracy," pp. 295-
330. 
13 Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, "Rethinking the Political Field in Hungary: From 
Politics of Confrontation to Politics of Competition," Journal of International Affairs 45, 
no. I (1991 ), pp. 201-45. 
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of changes that were institutionalized before they were completed or coordi-
nated. As a result, although the ancien regime was more prepared than any other 
in Eastern Europe to give up its power, there was no leadership to receive it. The 
same forces and problems that challenged the old Communist regimes now 
challenge the new government. The road is, at best, rocky. Poland, after the 
Communists, rocks from crisis to crisis, each escalated as before with symbol-
ism rather than actual decision making as its motor. 
Thus what we witness is a polarization of transition politics, coupled with 
an increasingly widespread political apathy and the same kind of gap between 
the leaders and the led that characterized the Communist era-except that this 
time, for the first time since the late 1940s when the Communists took over, the 
leaders are men and women who came from the led. They do not represent par-
ticular electoral groups any more than the men and women of the Communist-
era elections did. Instead, while they talk with the same rhetorical grandeur of 
the nation's interests, this time it is not about a movement toward Communism 
but about a transition from "Communist rule to democracy." The conundrum 
remains of how, even when a system has proved over and over that it can rally 
but not win, one moves from one political and economic system to another and 
leaves behind the behaviors and promises burnished in by repeated crises and 
partial victories for every actor. 
